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Abstract 
This paper uses a new data-set to examine how internal capital markets and foreign 
ownership affect investment. Our data allow us to compare investment behaviour of listed 
subsidiaries with stand-alone firms while controlling for investment opportunities of parent 
and subsidiary firms. We evaluate how the size of ownership and the geographical proximity 
of majority owners to their subsidiaries affect firm investment efficiency. We find that the 
investment of subsidiaries is more sensitive to investment opportunities than that of stand-
alone firms and falls when investment opportunities of parent firms improve. This suggests 
that there are internal capital markets that reallocate funds towards units with better 
investment opportunities. We find that investment allocation is most efficient where parents 
have modest ownership stakes and are distant from their subsidiaries and when subsidiaries 
operate in well developed financial markets. These results indicate that influence costs 
imposed by dominant parents may outweigh their potential informational benefits, especially 
when subsidiaries are located in countries with weaker financial development.   
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1  INTRODUCTION1 
 
There is an active debate about the impact of foreign ownership on host country 
economies. Policymakers in many countries including Continental Europe and the United 
States have sought to protect their domestic producers from the threat of foreign 
acquisitions. Others, in particular the United Kingdom, have taken a more benign view of 
foreign ownership regarding it as part of the efficient allocation of corporate control. It is 
often presumed that just as multinationals seek to avoid domestic taxes by shifting 
earnings to low tax regimes, so too they allocate capital to maximize their global returns 
irrespective of their impact on particular foreign subsidiaries or countries. 
 
While foreign ownership is high on the policy agenda, there is little academic evidence 
on its significance for investment. For example, little is known about how investment in 
subsidiaries is affected by investment opportunities of parent firms or how ownership of 
parent firms and proximity to their subsidiaries affect investment efficiency. To date, 
research on these questions has been hampered by lack of financial data on multinational 
subsidiaries. We overcome this problem by creating a new data-set. From a population of 
about 30,000 listed firms worldwide we identify nearly 5,000 separately listed 
subsidiaries and their parents that allow us to establish the effect of ownership on 
investment with a greater degree of precision than has been possible to date.  
 
The investment behaviour of firms inside and outside multinational networks relates to 
two distinct debates in the literature – on the existence and effects of internal capital 
markets and on the impact of foreign ownership on parent and host economies. Members 
of firm networks have access to sources of internal finance that their stand-alone 
counterparts may not. The existing literature on the comparative performance of 
subsidiaries and stand-alone firms – the bright versus the dark side of internal capital 
markets – highlights two opposing effects. On the one hand, in the presence of capital 
market imperfections, subsidiaries benefit from the access to external markets that 
parents provide (Inderst and Muller, 2003) or are able to access finance from other units 
within the multinational network (Stein, 2003). Moreover, parents may also impose 
discipline on subsidiaries by reallocating funds from those with greater access to those 
with greater need of resources (Stein, 2002). On the other hand, diversified 
conglomerates generally trade at lower value than comparable portfolios of specialized 
firms (Bhagat, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990, Berger and Ofek, 1996). Brusco and Panunzi 
(2000) claim that redistribution of capital between divisions weakens managerial 
incentives and Milgrom (1988), Milgrom and Roberts (1988) and Meyer, Milgrom and 
Roberts (1992) point to the wasteful influence activities in which managers of large 
organizations engage. This leads to soft budget constraints that cause internal capital 
markets to allocate too many resources to low value divisions and too few to high value 
divisions (Lamont 1997, Rajan, Servaes and Zingales, 2000, Scharfstein, 1998, 
Scharfstein and Stein, 2000, Shin and Stulz, 1998 and Wulf, 1999).  
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We contribute to this debate by introducing new findings from a dataset of publicly listed 
subsidiaries with majority owners. Existing research on the efficiency of the internal 
capital markets within diversified firms has been plagued by inadequate proxies for the 
investment opportunities of individual divisions of conglomerates. We analyze 
investment in a sample of subsidiary firms in more than 60 countries, which are more 
than 50 per cent owned by a parent firm, and which are also separately listed on stock 
markets. Since both parents and subsidiaries are quoted we can separately observe their 
investment opportunities as proxied by their Tobin’s Q. Our data also provide proxies for 
relationships between parents and subsidiaries that enable us to capture the role of 
information and influence activities on resource allocation in the firm. We use the size of 
the parent’s stake in the subsidiary, the geographical distance between the two and the 
discrepancy in the level of financial development between subsidiary and parent 
countries as proxies for the channels through which information or influence effects may 
operate.  
 
There is no consensus in the existing theoretical or empirical literature as to whether 
greater proximity along these dimensions is likely to enhance or reduce the 
responsiveness of subsidiary investment to the parent’s investment opportunities. 
Concentrated owners may be able to exercise stronger governance (Allen and Gale, 2000) 
than dispersed owners but may intervene excessively and undermine the autonomy of 
local management (Burkhart, Gromb and Panunzi, 1997). Financial relationships and the 
quality of information about subsidiaries may weaken with distance between parents and 
subsidiaries (Portes and Rey, 2001 and Wei and Wu, 2002)2 but so too may influence 
costs.  Foreign affiliates may be able to substitute internal for external borrowing when 
operating in poorly developed financial markets (Desai, Foley and Hines, 2003) but may 
also be particularly prone to adverse influence costs.3 
 
Our results also bear on the debate on the impact of foreign capital on host economies. 
On the one hand, foreign capital may increase the investment rate and bring various 
technology and productivity advantages that spill over to domestic firms. On the other 
hand, they may crowd out domestic firms and introduce instability by facilitating 
international transmission of shocks and exposing economies to increased volatility.4 
Desai and Foley (2005) argue that parents and subsidiaries exhibit highly correlated 
investment patterns, suggesting that foreign firms may be a transmission mechanism for 
macroeconomic shocks. Given the difficulty in describing the effects of foreign 
                                                 
2
 Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) find that investors are more likely to trade the stocks of firms that are 
proximate, communicate in the investor's native tongue, and have similar cultural attributes. Guiso, 
Sapienza and Zingales (2004) find that even in a country with uniform regulatory and institutional 
structures (Italy) access to finance for small firms depends on local financial development: distance 
matters. Buch (2005) finds that banks hold significantly lower assets in distant markets. In a study of loans 
in Pakistan, Mian (2005) finds that foreign banks do not lend to ‘informationally difficult’ yet 
fundamentally sound firms. Lending declines as geographical and cultural distance between the bank’s 
headquarters and its local branches rises. 
3
 See, for example, the discussion of the behaviour of MNEs in India toward their listed subsidiaries in 
2000 (‘Why Bombay's Blue Chips Are Down: Local investors suspect multinationals give them a raw deal’ 
Business Week Online October 30th 2000). 
4
 On the debate of the merits of international financial integration see Bhagwati (1998), Eichengreen 
(2003), Obstfeld (1998), and Rodrik (1998). 
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ownership on the host economy, several papers have focused on identifying specific 
channels through which this may operate. In this spirit, our examination of investment in 
foreign-owned subsidiaries may help to identify relevant determinants of whether foreign 
owners support their subsidiaries through down-turns as suggested by the ‘bail out’ 
hypothesis or whether they are the first to withdraw their investment in the face of 
negative shocks (Lipsey 2001). In the sample of firms we examine in this paper we find 
that in the Asian crisis, foreign-owned firms cut their capital investment by 51% while 
domestically owned firms cut theirs by 28% between 1996 and 1998.5 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains how the dataset was created and 
provides the empirical motivation for the paper. Section 3 outlines the methodological 
problems in the existing literature, explains the advantages of our data set and describes 
our empirical strategy. Sections 4 and 5 report our results. Section 6 summarizes our 
findings. 
 
 
2 DATA AND EMPIRICAL MOTIVATION  
 
Our sample is obtained from the OSIRIS database provided by Bureau van Dijk 
Electronic Publishing, which gathers its information from several sources including 
World’Vest Base, Fitch, Thomson Financial, Reuters, and Moody’s. This database is a 
“comprehensive database of listed companies … around the world” and provides 
information on 28,915 firms listed on the world’s stock exchanges. Table A1 in the 
appendix presents the distribution of these firms by country. The 69 countries in the data 
base include 23 ‘old’ OECD countries including Japan (19,576 firms), ten former Soviet 
bloc transition countries (281 firms), eleven Asian countries (6,456 firms), 467 firms 
from African countries, 910 from the Middle East and 1,225 from Central and Latin 
America.  
 
2.1 Data 
 
OWNERSHIP DATA 
 
The OSIRIS data base records a firm as having a parent if another entity has financial and 
legal responsibility for it, i.e., it holds more than 50 per cent and less than 100 per cent of 
the subsidiary’s equity. This is a strong definition of ownership, which enables us to 
observe situations in which the parent firm has enough authority to control the financial 
decisions of its subsidiaries and operate an internal capital market.  
 
Table 1 shows how the listed firms in selected countries are divided into stand-alone and 
owned firms, those that are foreign-owned and owner-firms. In the sample as a whole, 
three-quarters of the firms are stand-alone. This is typical of the US and is similar to the 
UK (71%). Stand-alone firms are markedly less dominant in Germany (48%) as well as 
                                                 
5
 From a sample of 1,100 listed firms in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand, which reported their capital expenditure as a proportion of total assets. See Section 
2 for details for details of the sample and definitions of variables. 
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in most Continental European economies, where large inter-corporate shareholdings are 
much more prevalent than elsewhere in the advanced economies. Stand-alone firms are 
more dominant in India (78%), Japan (83%) and China (85%). The vast majority of 
parent firms own subsidiaries abroad (Columns 5 and 6). It is interesting to note that 
despite having the most accessible takeover market of any country in the world, the UK 
has an unusually high proportion of owners of foreign firms, even by the standards of the 
US. 
 
Table 1. Composition of the sample by firm type and for selected countries 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Country Firms Stand-alone 
 
 
 
Owned 
 
 
 
Foreign- 
owned 
 
 
Owner of  
firm(s) 
 
 
Owner of  
foreign firm(s) 
All 28,915 74 23 8 3 3 
China  1,316 85 15 14 0 0 
Germany  756 48 47 13 4 4 
India  736 78 21 9 1 1 
Japan  3,598 83 14 8 2 2 
United Kingdom 1,869 71 20 9 10 9 
United States  7,751 76 20 3 4 4 
       
 
Notes: Columns 2-6 show the percentage of total firms in the respective category (the full list of countries 
is shown in Appendix 1). Column 2 shows firms that have no listed parents and no listed subsidiaries; 
Column 3 shows firms that report the identification number of a firm that is their ultimate (parent) (some of 
these firms may not be in the regression sample because we were unable to successfully match the parent); 
Column 4 shows firms that report the identification number of a firm that is their ultimate (parent) in 
another country.  
 
We discard firms from the sample if they experienced a change in ownership over the 
period, or if their ownership information is unavailable, or if key financial information 
(matched to and collected from Datastream) is missing over the period 1994 to 2005. 
OSIRIS only reports ownership at one point in time, 2005, but we have older ownership 
data from Dun and Bradstreet, which enables us to identify ownership in 1994. After 
matching these data we exclude firms from the sample if the location of their owner is 
different in these two datasets. Because we have no information on when ownership 
changed, we cannot make use of the subsample of firms for which ownership changes. 
This leaves us with 4,886 subsidiaries which have been continuously owned and 
controlled by 1,028 distinct global ultimate firms over the period. By excluding 
subsidiaries that were spun off or acquired between 1994 and 2005 we minimize the 
selection problem, discussed further in Section 3, which characterizes the use of spin-offs 
to test for the operation of an internal capital market. Figure A1 in the appendix illustrates 
how the sample was constructed. 
 
Table 2 presents basic descriptive data for the sample firms. Foreign owners are the 
largest firms, with median employees of 74,598, foreign-owned firms have 7,252, and 
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stand-alone domestic firms have an average number of 8,023. The size of the 
shareholding of the largest foreign owner is around 60% in the owned firms and less than 
10% in the stand-alone firms. In addition to the size of ownership, we also observe the 
country in which parent firms are located. The average distance of foreign-owned firms 
from their parents is 40% of half the circumference of the world. The foreign-owned 
firms operate in economies in which stock markets are significantly smaller and which 
have lower financial development than is the case for stand-alone or owner firms in the 
sample (see Table 2).   
 
Table 2. Descriptive characteristics of sample firms  
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
  Stand-alone 
 
Owned Foreign-owned 
 
Owner of 
firm(s) 
 
Owner of 
foreign firm(s) 
Firms  16,272 4,886 2,833 1,028 969 
Date of Incorporation  1974 1969 1968 1963 1961 
Employees  8,023 6,643 7,252 63,208 74,598 
Investment/ 
Total Assets 
Mean 0.045 0.051 0.050 0.051 0.051 
 Std dev. 0.051 0.052 0.053 0.045 0.044 
 Median 0.032 0.036 0.035 0.042 0.042 
Cash Flow / Total Assets Mean 0.063 0.070 0.066 0.075 0.075 
 Std dev. 0.076 0.074 0.073 0.062 0.060 
 Median 0.061 0.069 0.065 0.074 0.074 
Sales growth Mean 0.070 0.068 0.069 0.092 0.094 
 Std dev. 0.250 0.244 0.252 0.233 0.233 
 Median 0.071 0.069 0.074 0.085 0.086 
Q Mean 1.58 1.6 1.59 1.96 1.96 
 Std dev. 1.06 1.06 1.08 1.05 1.05 
 Median 1.32 1.33 1.31 1.74 1.74 
Shareholding of Largest 
Owner 
 9.02 61.91 57.45   
Distance to owner/(π .r) % Mean  35.8 38.3 34.5 35 
 Std dev.  23.7 22.4 25.1 24.9 
 Median  36.1 40.4 32 32 
Stock Market Size/GDP % Mean 60.3 49.6 53.2 58.6 58.1 
 Std dev. 32 30.9 34 27.7 28 
 Median 53.2 53.2 53.2 53.2 53.2 
Private Sector Credit/GDP 
% 
Mean 145 129 129 143 141 
 Std dev. 69.1 61.5 70.6 56.6 56.3 
 Median 139 104 104 121 121 
Notes: These data are for the firms for which we have ownership and location and financial data (i.e. the 
regression sample) whereas Table 1 includes all firms for which we have ownership and location data. 
Investment on total assets is Datastream item 08416 Asset Utilization Ratio measured as the annual item 
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Capital Expenditures / (Total Assets - Customer Liabilities on Acceptances). Cash-flow is Datastream item 
04860 (Net cash flow from operating activities) divided by total assets.  Q is the share price divided by the 
book value per share (Datastream PTBV). Sales growth is the log difference in sales in US$ from 
Datastream item number 07240. Distance to owner is the great circle distance between capital cities of the 
two countries measured as a percentage of half the earth’s circumference (i.e. max is 100). Employees is 
Datastream item WC07011.  
 
 
 
FINANCIAL AND INVESTMENT DATA 
 
The OSIRIS data-base reports a unique identification number for each parent firm that 
enables us to match firms with financial data on their parents. This was merged with the 
market and financial data from Datastream. We have time series observations on firms 
over the period from 1994 to 2005. The average number of observations per firm is six.  
 
Capital expenditure measures funds used to acquire fixed assets including expenditures 
on plant and equipment, structures and property but excluding any expenditures 
associated with mergers or acquisitions. To account for differences in size and for 
inflation over time and to avoid heteroscedasticity we divide investment by total assets at 
the beginning of the period. Table 2 shows that the investment ratio of owned firms and 
of owners is higher (at around 5% of assets) as compared with that of stand-alone firms 
(4.5%).6   
 
We use a measure of Tobin’s Q as a proxy for the assessment by the market of the 
investment opportunities available to the firm. Theoretically, marginal Q should be used 
as the approximation of present and expected future investment opportunities but since 
marginal Q is unobservable, we use average Q as a proxy. We measure average Q as the 
firm’s market-to-book ratio at the end of the prior fiscal year. The parent’s data is given 
in consolidated form, so we take out the effect of the subsidiary to extract the parent’s Q.7 
Tobin’s Q for parent firms (1.96) is significantly in excess of that of stand-alone and 
owned firms (1.6).   
 
Liquidity can be calculated in two different ways, either as a stock of cash or as cash 
flow. The flow measure has proved to be the empirically more successful proxy for 
liquidity in the past (Devereux, 1989). Hence, we use cash flow as a proxy for the 
liquidity constraints of the firm. In accordance with our procedure with respect to 
investment, we adjust for size and inflation by dividing cash flow by total assets at the 
start of the year. Cash flow is between 6% and 7.5% of assets, with the lowest value in 
stand-alone firms and the highest in owner firms.  
 
There is an active debate as to whether the significance of cash flow terms in investment 
equations can be interpreted as evidence of financing constraints.  Based on firms’ annual 
                                                 
6
 Note that we took the effect of subsidiary variables out of consolidated data in order to get parent’s data 
e.g. Total Q = asset-weighted sum of parent and subsidiary Q; from which we calculate unconsolidated Q. 
7
 We use the employment in the subsidiary Ei and the total consolidated employment, ET to determine the 
firm’s Qj which we call parent’s Q, but really refers to the Q of the entire entity except the subsidiary. The 
firm’s consolidated Q is QT = ((Qi*Ei + Qj*Ej)/ET). So parent’s Q is Qj =(QT*ET-Qi*Ei)/Ej.  
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reports and managements’ discussions of liquidity requirements, Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997) conclude that it cannot while Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (2000) contend that 
Kaplan and Zingales’ methodology is flawed.  Gomes (2002) argues that the presence of 
cash flow variables in investment equations is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition 
for capital market imperfections. They are not necessary since financial constraints 
should be reflected in firm valuations and therefore in marginal Q and they are not 
sufficient because non-linearities may be captured by cash flow in linear investment 
equations.  Cooper and Ejarque (2001) demonstrate that the inclusion of profit variables 
may reflect market power rather than capital market imperfections in investment 
equations that use average in place of marginal Q.  For this reason we are cautious in the 
following analysis to interpret cash flow variables as evidence of financing constraints. 
We return to these issues in the discussion of our econometric strategy in Section 3. 
 
 
THE SAMPLE OF LISTED SUBSIDIARIES 
 
We are concerned that our results for listed firms may not be easily generalized to the 
broader population of multinational subsidiaries. Table 3 provides summary information 
about the characteristics of listed and unlisted subsidiaries of a sub-sample of the firms in 
our sample. The sample comprises all of the firms – a total of 51 – that are parents of at 
least one of the top 2,000 listed companies and at least one of the top 2,000 unlisted 
companies in Western Europe. These data show that parents typically have over 50% 
more unlisted than listed subsidiaries. The listed subsidiaries are larger in terms of both 
assets and employment. The median ownership stake of the parent of unlisted 
subsidiaries is 100% and 57% for listed subsidiaries. In general the differences between 
the two types of firms suggest that listed subsidiaries are larger and more independent 
than their unlisted counterparts. This indicates that our choice of sample makes it less 
likely that we would observe an effect of parental control on the investment decisions of 
the subsidiary.  
 
Table 3. Comparison between listed and unlisted subsidiaries 
 
  Listed Subsidiaries Unlisted Subsidiaries 
Number of subsidiaries 
in this sample 
Mean 1.37 2.16 
Total Assets (USD) Mean 12,000,000 4,900,000 
 Std. dev. 29,000,000 5,300,000 
 Median 4,200,000 2,900,000 
Employment Mean 31,583 13,995 
 Std. dev. 54,700 9,175 
 Median 13,352 11,143 
Share of ownership Mean 55.2 95.9 
 Std. dev. 22 14.1 
 Median 57 100 
    
Notes: The sample is all the firms (51 of them) that are parents to at least one of the top 2,000 listed 
companies and at least one of the top 2,000 unlisted companies in Western Europe.  
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2.2 Empirical motivation  
 
Affiliate firms may benefit from liquidity spillovers in their internal capital markets. 
Improved access to internal capital markets may increase financing flexibility. There may 
be ‘more money’ available if integration leads to a larger total entity, which can raise 
more external finance than could the individual entities themselves as suggested by the 
data in Table 4, which compares a number of characteristics of subsidiaries and their 
parents. Although cash flow and investment relative to total assets are virtually identical 
in parent firms and their subsidiaries, the total assets of parent firms are more than ten 
times as large and their cash on hand is far higher (see Table 4).  
 
 
Table 4. Comparison between subsidiaries and their owners 
 
 Parent Subsidiary 
Investment/Total Assets 0.0555 0.0581 
Cash flow/Total Assets 0.0924 0.0928 
Total Assets 23,230,472 1,818,149 
Cash flow (USD) 938,883 107,047 
Cash (USD) 18,655,999 93,517 
Stock Market Size in Parent 
or Subsidiary Country 
(% GDP) 
58.2 55.0 
Notes: Cash is item 02003 from Datastream representing liquid assets including Cash on hand; undeposited 
checks; cash in banks; money orders; letters of credit; central bank deposits; bullion. Stock Market Size is 
the ratio of the total market value of listed companies to GDP from the World Bank. 
 
 
For subsidiaries, the presence of a parent may alleviate any underinvestment problem 
caused by financing constraints. Descriptive statistics from our sample indicate that 
investment by multinational subsidiaries is, on average, less responsive to their own 
financial resources and more responsive to their investment opportunities than stand-
alone firms (see Table 5). In our sample, the level of investment as a percentage of total 
assets is about 10% higher in multinational subsidiaries than in stand-alone firms. We 
divide the sample by comparing firms that ostensibly have fewer own resources (less than 
average cash flow as a proportion of total assets) but better investment opportunities 
(higher than average Tobin’s Q) with those that have more cash but weaker investment 
opportunities. Among the sub-sample of firms with below average cash flow and above 
average values of Tobin’s Q, investment by multinational subsidiaries is 14% higher than 
in stand-alone firms whereas for firms with above average cash flow and below average 
Q, investment in MNEs is 8% lower than in stand-alone firms.  
 
The presence of a parent may affect a firm’s ability to respond to shocks and local 
financial conditions. As noted in the introduction, in the Asian crisis between 1996 and 
1998, foreign-owned firms in our sample cut their capital investment by 51% while 
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domestically owned firms cut theirs by 28%. It appears from Table 5 that more generally 
MNE subsidiaries and stand-alone firms respond differently to shocks. Foreign 
subsidiaries cut their investment during periods of recession in the subsidiary country by 
much more than do domestic firms: in our sample, domestic firms reduce their 
investment to asset ratio by 10% whereas foreign-owned ones reduce it by nearly twice 
this. There is no discernible reaction of subsidiary investment to a recession in the 
country of the parent firm.  
 
When we compare the response of investment to a recession in countries with low and 
high levels of financial development (as measured by the ratio of private credit to the 
private sector to GDP), we find that investment falls by much more in less financially 
developed countries (Table 5).  
 
Table 5. Investment / Total Assets for Stand-Alone and Foreign-Owned Firms 
 
 
 Stand-
alone 
Foreign-
owned 
All firms 
 0.045 0.050 
Firms with <ave. CF and >ave. Q 
 0.035 0.040 
Firms with >ave. CF and <ave. Q 
 0.052 0.048 
 
   
Financial Development:  
   
Private Credit/GDP in home country High 0.051 0.052 
 Low 0.063 0.065 
 
   
Macro Conditions: recession in 
   
    Own Country No recession 0.058 0.062 
 Recession 0.052 0.050 
    Parent Country No recession  0.059 
 Recession  0.059 
 
   
Financial Development & Macro Conditions 
   
High Private Credit/GDP in home country No recession 0.053 0.056 
 Recession 0.049 0.048 
Low Private Credit/GDP in home country No recession 0.066 0.069 
 Recession 0.058 0.054 
Notes: CF is cash flow/total assets; Q is Tobin’s Q. Financial development is measured as the ratio of 
private credit to GDP from the World Bank. See the Appendix for an explanation of how recession years 
were identified. 
 
As Table 6 shows, more distant and less closely held subsidiaries cut investment by more 
in recessions. Subsidiaries located further from their parents reduce investment by 15% in 
recessions as compared with a 10% reduction in more proximate ones, and those 
subsidiaries whose equity is shared among several owners reduce investment by twice as 
much as those with more concentrated ownership (see Table 6).  
 
 
 12 
Table 6. Variation of Investment (/Total Assets) in Recession and Non Recession 
Years for Foreign-Owned Firms: Distance and Ownership Concentration Effects 
 
 Above median distance from 
owner 
Below median distance from 
owner 
Non-recession year in subsidiary 
country 
0.054 0.062 
Recession year in subsidiary 
country 
0.046 0.056 
 Below median ownership 
concentration 
Above median ownership 
concentration 
Non-recession year in subsidiary 
country 
0.067 0.058 
Recession year in subsidiary 
country 
0.053 0.052 
Notes: Ownership concentration is the share of equity held by the largest shareholder. For a detailed 
explanation of definitions and sources, see Section 3.  
 
We can summarize the descriptive data presented in this section as follows: 
 
- from the comparison of stand-alone and foreign-owned firms, there is prima facie 
evidence of the existence of an internal capital market for foreign-owned firms, which 
enhances the efficiency of investment; 
- investment of foreign-owned firms appears to respond more strongly to a domestic 
recession than does that of stand-alone firms; 
- investment by both stand-alone and foreign-owned firms is cut back more sharply in a 
recession in less financially developed countries; 
- investment by firms with more distant parents and owners with smaller stakes respond 
more strongly to a domestic recession than do firms with parents in close proximity or 
with a larger ownership stake. 
 
  
3 METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES & EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
 
3.1 Methodological problems 
 
Previous investigations of the question of how ownership affects the efficiency of 
investment have focused on the investment behaviour of divisions of conglomerate firms. 
The canonical example is that of a CEO who oversees multiple lines of business, each 
with their own managers. Does the CEO use her authority to transfer funds across the 
firm’s divisions, and does this tend, on average, to improve or worsen the investment 
efficiency of the combined entity? Empirically this question is conceived of in the 
following way: holding the investment conditions of one division constant, does its 
investment appear to be affected by the conditions of other divisions in the firm? A good 
example is Shin and Stulz (1998) who diagnosed inefficient cross-subsidization from the 
presence of a positive coefficient on the cash-flow of one division in a firm on the 
investment of another. 
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Most studies find that internal capital markets do exist, and the weight of evidence 
suggests that, on average, conglomerate firms engage in internal socialism among their 
divisions (Shin and Stultz, 1998, Scharfstein, 1998, Rajan, Servaes and Zingales, 2000, 
surveyed in Stein, 2003).8 However, doubt has been cast on the conclusion of ‘internal 
socialism’ by the finding that in financially unrelated firms that are known to merge later, 
a similar relationship to that in Shin and Stulz between the cash flow of one firm and the 
investment of the other is found (Chevalier, 2004). 
 
While the cross-subsidisation conclusion is widespread in the literature, it has primarily 
emerged from a methodology that is vulnerable to two related problems. It assumes that 
the divisions of conglomerate firms are allocated randomly to parent firms and that they 
are drawn randomly from the same distribution as are stand-alone firms. On the basis of 
these assumptions, the average industry (segment) Q serves as a reliable proxy for the 
division’s investment opportunities.9 However if the diversification decision is 
endogenous, then conglomerate divisions are systematically different from stand-alone 
firms and industry Q’s may not be good proxies for the opportunities of conglomerate 
divisions (Whited, 2001).10 Chevalier (2004) looks at the investment activity of firms in 
the period before they merge into a single entity. She finds that investment patterns that 
have been attributed to cross-subsidisation are visible in the behaviour of pre-merger 
firms (i.e. that are not financially related), suggesting that some of the cross-subsidisation 
results in the literature may be attributable to selection bias. 
 
In an attempt to circumvent this problem, Gertner, Powers and Scharfstein (2002) 
investigate the investment behaviour of firms that are spun off from a conglomerate. 
They observe that once a division is spun off from its parent, its investment responds 
more sensitively to industry Q, from which they infer inefficiency in the conglomerate. 
Çolak and Whited (2005) take issue with this approach and demonstrate that contrary to 
claims that it provides a clean test of the efficiency of internal capital markets, the results 
are contaminated by the presence of selection bias and measurement error. The decision 
to spin off a division is not a random one: a division is likely to be spun off only in cases 
where the combined entity is less valuable than the sum of its parts. Thus while the 
results in the ‘spin off’ papers provide evidence of inefficient overinvestment in their 
samples, it almost certainly presents a biased picture of the efficiency of internal capital 
markets in the population of conglomerates.11 
                                                 
8
 Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) compare the investment of divisions of diversified conglomerates 
with investment by stand-alone firms. They find that divisions in industries with low investment prospects 
(measured by average industry Q ratios) invest more than stand-alone firms in the same industry, and 
divisions with high investment prospects invest less than their stand-alone counterparts. Scharfstein (1998) 
shows that the sensitivity of investment to industry Q is much lower for conglomerate divisions than for 
stand-alone firms. 
9
 The average Tobin’s Q of stand-alone firms in an industry provides a reasonable proxy for the investment 
opportunities of a division of a conglomerate in the same industry if, as has been suggested, industry effects 
account for much of the variation in Tobin’s Q (Stein 2003).  
10
 Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) argue that a firm’s diversification is an endogenous decision determined 
by the underlying characteristics of the pre-merger firms. Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (2002) argue that 
stand-alone firms are systematically different from divisions of conglomerate firms in the same industry.  
11
 Similar methodological problems have plagued the parallel literature on the costs or benefits of group 
membership of Japanese keiretsu. Early studies such as Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein, 1991 and Prowse 
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In the sample of conglomerate firms we investigate in this paper, the divisions (known 
more familiarly as ‘subsidiaries’ in this context) are separately listed firms. We therefore 
avoid the central empirical problem of the previous literature that the observed 
differences in the investment of divisions and stand-alone firms are the consequence of 
their different investment opportunities rather than their different financing options. Of 
course the financing relationship between a domestic owner or a multinational 
headquarters and its listed subsidiaries is different from the relationship between a 
conglomerate and its divisions. As noted in Section 2, we drop from our sample 
subsidiaries that have changed ownership recently, mitigating the selection problem 
associated with the use of spin-offs. Listed subsidiaries are, by their nature, not wholly 
owned by their parents; and this lower concentration of ownership may cause managers 
of listed subsidiaries to have a higher degree of autonomy than divisional managers. We 
may therefore be less likely to observe evidence consistent with an internal capital market 
than would be the case in less independent subsidiaries. To minimise this difference, we 
restrict our sample to listed subsidiaries which report a ‘global ultimate’ – a particularly 
strong parental relationship, which requires an ownership stake of the parent of more than 
50%. To the extent we do find evidence of a financial relationship between parent and 
subsidiary, this provides new evidence on the presence of an internal capital market that 
extends from divisions to listed subsidiaries.  
 
As we have seen, although there are sceptical voices, the conventional wisdom in the 
literature on internal capital markets in conglomerate firms points towards the presence of 
soft budget constraints or ‘internal socialism’. Whilst evidence from our sample cannot 
be used directly in resolving this dispute because by definition our sample is different, it 
can nevertheless be seen to either reinforce the conventional wisdom or to add to the 
doubts about it discussed above. Since the firms in our sample encompass a range of 
ownership stakes of the parent between 50% and 100%, we can see whether the financing 
relationship changes as a listed subsidiary becomes more like a wholly owned one. 
 
3.2 Empirical strategy  
 
Tables 5 and 6 in Section 2 showed average differences between stand-alone and foreign-
owned firms in the responsiveness of investment to cash flow and to Q and how these 
differences vary with ownership concentration, distance and the level of financial 
development. The remainder of the paper seeks to test whether these patterns persist 
when examined more systematically.  
 
To do this, we use specifications very similar to those in Shin and Stulz (1998) and in 
Chevalier (2004).  
 
(1)    0 1 2 3it it it it i t itInv Q CF SG u vα α α α ε= + + + + + +  
                                                                                                                                                 
1992 identified benefits of membership whereas more recent ones (e.g. Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998 and 
Morck and Nakamura, 1999) have identified costs. In a recent study of Korean chaebols, Ferris, Kim and 
Kitsabunnarat (2003) argue in favour of the inefficiency of the chaebol using a methodology similar to that 
criticized by Çolak and Whited.  
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where Invit is capital expenditure divided by total assets for firm i, i.e. , 1/it it i tInv I K −≡ ; 
Qit is Tobin’s Q ratio for the firm, i.e. market value of assets divided by the book value; 
CFit denotes firm i’s cash flow divided by its total assets; SGit is the sales growth for firm 
i.12  The firm fixed effect is ui and the time dummy is vt. 
 
We run this specification for our sample of owned firms and compare it to our sample of 
stand-alone firms. We use matching techniques to account for the possibility that 
membership of the sample of owned firms is endogenous. In particular we are concerned 
that the levels of our variable of interest (Qit) may jointly determine the likelihood of a 
firm being a subsidiary and the relationship between its investment opportunities and its 
actual investment. We use the propensity score matching method of Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983). We identify the probability that a firm is a subsidiary using a probit model. 
 
 P(Subihc=1) = F(Zihc, Dhc), 
 
where F is the normal cumulative distribution function, Zihc is a vector of firm 
characteristics including Q, cash flow, and sales growth, and Dhc is a full set of country 
and industry dummies, where the subscript h is industry and c is country. We use the 
predicted probability, Pikc, as a monotone function to select comparison stand-alone 
observations for each subsidiary observation. The nearest neighbour, k, to each subsidiary 
observation is selected such that  
 
 | Pihc – Pkhc | = min{ Pihc – Pkhc } 
 
over all k in the set of stand-alone firms. Matches are only accepted if min{ Pihc – Pkhc } is 
less than a caliper which we vary. The strength of this method also relies on our ability to 
identify the variables that determine firm ownership. While our model has only weak 
predictive power it does allow us to check that sample selection is not driven by our key 
variables of interest (see Table A2 in the Appendix). We find no significant difference 
between our results for the whole sample of stand-alone firms and the matched sample 
derived from calipers between 0.005 and 0.01.   
 
To test for the presence of an internal capital market we supplement equation (1) with the 
parent firm’s cash flow and the parent’s Q, where the parent of firm i is designated by 
subscript j:  
 
(2)    0 1 2 3 4 5it it it it jt jt i t itInv Q CF SG Q CF u vα α α α α α ε= + + + + + + + +  
 
We are concerned to ensure that any relationship between the parent’s financial 
circumstances and the investment of the child measures a direct effect of their 
                                                 
12
 Since firms typically operate under conditions of imperfect competition in the product market, it is 
appropriate to augment the usual Q equation with sales growth to capture the impact on investment of a 
shift in the demand curve. The firm fixed effect is ui and the time dummy is vt.  
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relationship rather than a general correlation in the population of subsidiaries and parents 
caused by, for example, correlated macroeconomic conditions within or across countries. 
To verify this we construct a matching sample of surrogate parent firms by selecting the 
firm in the same industry and country of the real parent that is closest in size to the real 
parent to check whether a relationship emerges between subsidiary and surrogate parent 
that could not be due to the operation of an internal capital market.  
 
There is continuing debate in the literature as to the appropriate specification of an 
investment equation. The state of the debate is summarized in Bond and Van Reenen 
(2003). Structural approaches either directly estimate the Q model or take the Euler 
equation route.13  Implementation of both approaches requires restrictive assumptions to 
be made concerning the relationship between marginal and average Q in the former and 
about the nature of production function and the linearity of the marginal adjustment costs 
in the latter. The unique feature of our data is that it gives us access to stock market 
information on subsidiary as well as parent firms and we therefore use a Q approach. 
 
Our first experiment in which we compare stand-alone firms with those that have a 
dominant parent is best thought of as a variant of the ‘sample splitting’ approach. In the 
tradition of Fazzari et al. (1998), we proceed on the basis that although the Q model may 
be misspecified, these problems may affect all firms in the same way, with the 
implication that differences in the coefficients on the Q and cash flow variables convey 
information on differences in investment opportunities and financing constraints across 
groups of firms that are listed in the same financial market (Bond and Van Reenen, p. 
65), though as noted above we are cautious about the interpretation of cash flow as 
financing constraints.14  
 
However, once we introduce the parent variables, our aim is to identify the role of parent 
financial variables in the investment behaviour of the subsidiary. We use firm fixed 
effects estimation, which means that the experiment we are considering is how does a 
shock to the parent firm’s Q affect subsidiary investment, controlling for the subsidiary’s 
investment opportunities. If the subsidiary can borrow at a lower cost of capital from the 
parent firm, this will already be incorporated in the subsidiary’s Q. Given that we can 
control for Qi, we can identify the impact on subsidiary investment of new information 
that affects Qj making investment outcomes for the parent more attractive.  
  
A major empirical failing of Q models is the very small estimated coefficient on Q. When 
interpreted within the structural model, this implies unrealistically high adjustment costs 
of the capital stock. Measurement error is a serious problem. For example, the firm’s cash 
position may contain information about its investment opportunities.15 Strong evidence of 
this phenomenon comes from natural experiments that investigate shocks to firms’ cash 
                                                 
13
 For related work using the Euler equation approach see Love (2004) and Harrison, Love and McMillan 
(2004). 
14
 The concerns about this raised in Section 2 are reflected in our empirical specification, which includes 
sales growth. We also test for the presence of non-linearities in the investment function. 
15
 Erickson and Whited (2000) highlight the problem that average Q is a noisy proxy for marginal Q and, in 
particular, that average Q may be related to cash flow if firms accumulate cash when they are abnormally 
profitable.  
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position unrelated to their investment opportunities (Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Shleifer 1994, and see Stein 2003 for a survey). The problem of measurement error in Q 
has been addressed in different ways. The use of natural experiments of large changes in 
tax regime provides the opportunity for the fundamental role of Q to show up in changes 
in investment, reducing the impact of measurement error. The results (e.g. Cummins, 
Hassett and Hubbard 1994 and 1996) are striking: the size of the coefficient on Q 
increases by an order of magnitude as compared with its typical size in OLS estimations. 
These results are consistent with two other approaches to estimation that focus 
specifically on trying to mitigate the measurement error in Q generated by bubble 
phenomena in stock prices (Erickson and Whited 2000 and Bond and Cummins 2001).   
 
The more familiar econometric problem of dealing with the likely endogeneity of Q and 
the cash flow and sales growth variables is sometimes dealt with by using GMM 
estimation, where lagged values of the levels and changes in the right hand side variables 
are used as instruments. Typically these approaches have struggled to find significant and 
/ or sizeable Q effects and report that cash flow is highly significant even after allowing 
for endogeneity (see the summary in Bond and Van Reenen). However, this issue is less 
worrying in the context of our specifications. Since our specifications include fixed 
effects, we are modelling deviations in Q, which are in theory generated by new 
information and are unlikely to be easily instrumented by past values. Indeed in this 
context, the applicability of GMM methods is further reduced since we would not expect 
lagged levels of Q’s and changes in Q’s to be good instruments for current deviations of 
Q’s.  
  
Bringing these results together, our approach is to estimate the simple model specified 
above using OLS (with firm fixed effects), recognizing that the estimated size of the 
coefficient on Q will be biased downwards due to the presence of measurement error.  
We conduct some other robustness checks and report them in Section 4 to control, for 
example, for the presence of non-convexities in the adjustment cost function as suggested 
by Abel and Eberly (1996).  
 
Our central focus is on whether the financial variables of the parent firm affect 
investment in the subsidiary and how this in turn is affected by ownership concentration, 
distance etc. Given the problems with measurement, especially of the Q variable, it is 
necessary to discuss the direction of the likely biases on the parent financial variables. 
We begin by examining the correlation between subsidiary and parent variables. There is 
little correlation between subsidiary and parent cash flow, Q or investment (see Table 7): 
these correlations are reassuring in the sense that they do not point toward the existence 
of omitted variables that are correlated with both. For example, if there was a strong 
negative correlation between parent and subsidiary Q, one would worry that the finding 
of a negative coefficient on parent Q in the investment equation was due to an omitted 
factor. It seems that the biases will be either attenuation bias (as discussed above due to 
measurement error) or a positive bias to the extent that there are omitted variables 
correlated with both subsidiary investment and with parent financial variables. This 
would suggest that it will be harder for us to detect a negative sign on the parent’s Q as 
implied by the ‘efficiency of the internal capital market’ hypothesis.    
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Table 7. Relationships between subsidiaries and their owners 
 
 Number of pairs Mean of correlations across  
cross-sectional   
subsidiary-owner pairs 
Cash-flow 200,112 0.01 
Q 215,151 0.001 
Investment/total assets 197,212 0.015 
 
Note: Cash-flow is Datastream item 04860 (Net cash flow from operating activities) divided by total assets. 
Q is the share price divided by the book value per share (Datastream PTBV). Investment/total assets is 
Datastream item 08416 Asset Utilization Ratio measured as the annual item Capital Expenditures / (Total 
Assets - Customer Liabilities on Acceptances).  
 
 
4 Internal capital markets: results 
 
The first question is whether internal capital markets operate across firms and their listed 
subsidiaries as they have been demonstrated to exist within conglomerates. The 
availability of Tobin’s Q at the level of the subsidiary enables us to extend our 
understanding of how investment in subsidiaries responds to changes in the investment 
opportunities of parent firms.  
 
We begin our experiments with the largest sample, namely of subsidiaries irrespective of 
whether the parent is foreign or domestic. We compare these with stand-alone firms and 
then introduce the interaction with the parent’s financial variables. There are good 
reasons to expect that the presence of a parent could ease capital constraints created by 
imperfect external capital markets. As documented in Section 1, in our sample, parents 
are, on average, much larger than their subsidiaries, potentially giving them greater 
access to external finance. In addition the median parent in our sample has cash on hand 
which exceeds cash in the median subsidiary by more than two orders of magnitude 
(Table 4).  
 
As discussed in Section 3, we first estimate the following equation: 
(1)    0 1 2 3it it it it i t itInv Q CF SG u vα α α α ε= + + + + + +  
We would expect that in perfect capital markets, α 2 and α 3 would be zero. 
 
Table 8 indicates that in addition to Tobin’s Q, both sales growth and cash flow have a 
significant effect on the level of capital expenditure undertaken by the firm, i.e. consistent 
with imperfect external capital markets, financial slack appears to affect investment 
activity. Of course these simple regressions are subject to the econometric problems of 
measurement error and endogeneity discussed in Section 3. We therefore concentrate on 
the difference between the estimates of α 1 and α 2 in Columns 1 and 2, i.e. between owned 
firms and the matched sample of stand-alone firms, which entails assuming that the 
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econometric problems do not affect owned and stand-alone firms in the same market in 
different ways.  
 
Table 8.  Regression of Investment of Stand-alone Firms and Owned Firms on 
Tobin’s Q, Cash Flow and Sales Growth  
  
 1 2 3 4 5 
Variable Stand-alone 
(matched 
sample) 
Owned 
firms 
Owned 
firms, 
including 
parent cash 
flow & Q 
Matched 
to 
surrogate 
parent 
As for (3) 
with 
industry × 
time 
dummies 
SGi 0.0055*** 0.0059*** 0.0058*** 0.0053*** 0.0082*** 
 0.0007 0.0010 0.0010 0.0011 0.0010 
CFi  0.0542*** 0.0438*** 0.0445*** 0.0452*** 0.0410*** 
 0.0032 0.0047 0.0046 0.0054 0.0046 
Qi 0.0075*** 0.0082*** 0.0082*** 0.0084*** 0.0066*** 
 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 
CFj    0.0068 0.0039 0.0072 
   0.0119 0.0124 0.0111 
Qj   -0.0010** -0.0000 -0.0006** 
   0.0005 0.0005 0.0003 
Constant 0.0332*** 0.0344*** 0.0346*** 0.0345*** 0.0436*** 
 0.0004 0.0006 0.0006 0.0007 0.0009 
      
No. obs. 30381 29576 29878 24040 29878 
R2 .0361 .0345 .0350 .0332 0.062 
Notes: Columns 1 to 5 are estimated by OLS with firm fixed effects and year dummies. Column 5 also 
includes 2-digit industry dummies interacted with time. R2 is the ‘within’ R2. Robust standard errors are 
reported beneath the coefficients. *** 1%; ** 5% and * 10% level of significance. 
 
Investment by owned firms – which potentially have access to internal sources of finance 
within the group in addition to external sources – is significantly less sensitive to cash 
flow and more sensitive to its own Q.16 The size of the coefficients on Q are similar to 
those reported by Chevalier (2004) but as explained in Section 3, the magnitude and 
hence the economic significance of the coefficient on Q is difficult to discern from this 
exercise – we recall that Cummins et al. found a tenfold increase in the size of the 
coefficient when they used the natural experiment of major tax changes to control for the 
measurement error in Q.   
 
Further evidence of the presence of internal capital markets is found by introducing the 
financial conditions of the parent firms. The extent to which parents move funds between 
entities to equalise the return from investment across projects will depend on the relative 
value of each entity’s investment opportunities. Parents with greater investment 
opportunities than their affiliates will have a larger incentive to repatriate spare funds. 
Thus if the internal capital market actively reallocates funds across related entities then 
we expect the affiliate’s investment to be decreasing in the parent’s Q, holding the 
affiliate’s Q constant. Since we observe the cash flow and Q of both parent and 
                                                 
16
 T-tests of the equality of the coefficients in Columns 1 and 2 are rejected at the 5% level. 
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subsidiary, we are able to test directly for effects consistent with presence of a financing 
relationship between them. 
 
In Column 3 we investigate the effects of financial conditions within the parent on the 
investment of the subsidiary firms. This entails estimating equation (2) with the parent’s 
cash flow and the parent’s Q, where the parent of firm i is designated by subscript j 
(shown again for convenience):  
 
(2)    0 1 2 3 4 5it it it it jt jt i t itInv Q CF SG Q CF u vα α α α α α ε= + + + + + + + +  
 
Table 8 indicates that the parent’s cash flow is not significant in the subsidiary’s 
investment equation and the parent’s Q has a significant negative effect. As predicted by 
the efficient internal capital market or ‘internal Darwinism’ argument and contrary to the 
‘internal socialism’ argument, an increase in the parent’s Q leads to a reduction in the 
subsidiary’s investment.  
 
In Column 4 we check that the negative influence of the parent’s Q is not picking up 
some spurious industry or country effect by matching subsidiaries with a surrogate 
parent. The surrogate parent is another firm in the same industry and country and as close 
in size as possible to that of the real parent. We find that there is no significant influence 
of the surrogate parent Q on the subsidiary’s investment. In Column 5 we approach this 
issue in another way by running the standard regression (Column 3) augmented by 
interactions between the 2-digit industry of the firm and the year.  The inclusion of the 
additional dummies does not affect the results. In line with the work of Abel and Eberly 
on non-convex adjustment costs, we checked to see if higher orders of Q were significant 
in the investment equation but they were not.  
 
In order to check whether there is something specific to US MNEs, we repeat the basic 
regressions for the sample of foreign-owned firms excluding US firms both as owners 
and as subsidiaries (Table 9). The results remain unchanged. We also split the sample 
between firms whose principal activity is in manufacturing and those with a non-
manufacturing core. The results for manufacturing firms were similar to those for the full 
sample (Table 9). 
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Table 9. Robustness Checks: Non-US Firms and Manufacturing Firms 
 
 1 2 
Variable Non-US firms Manufacturing firms 
   
SGi 0.0065*** 0.0037** 
 0.0010 0.0015 
CFi 0.0446*** 0.0516*** 
 0.0048 0.0064 
Qi 0.0082*** 0.0082*** 
 0.0003 0.0005 
CFj 0.0184 -0.0047 
 0.0147 0.0182 
Qj -0.0010*** -0.0016*** 
 0.0005 0.0005 
Constant 0.0344*** 0.0379*** 
 0.0007 0.0009 
   
N 28152 13798 
R2 .0356 0.0382 
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 are estimated by OLS with firm fixed effects and year dummies. R2 is the ‘within’ 
R2. Robust standard errors are reported beneath the coefficients. *** 1%; ** 5% and * 10% level of 
significance. 
       
 
This section has presented several pieces of evidence from our data that suggest owners 
reallocate funds across subsidiary entities and that this is consistent with the efficient 
operation of an internal capital market. Parent firms have greater cash resources and 
superior access to external capital markets. Investment by owned firms is less sensitive to 
cash flow and more sensitive to investment opportunities than stand-alone firms. And 
subsidiaries’ investment is negatively affected by the opportunities available to the 
parent. Our discussion in Section 3 suggested that the likely biases would work against 
finding evidence consistent with an internal capital market and against finding a negative 
effect of the parent’s Q. The results we report would therefore tend to underestimate both 
effects.  
 
The earlier discussion suggests that these results may be interpreted as implying that 
internal capital markets allocate capital efficiently since they appear to mitigate liquidity 
constraints and to increase the sensitivity of capital expenditure to investment 
opportunities. Our results appear to be at least consistent with the effects of increased 
information in the internal capital markets of owned firms and their separately listed 
subsidiaries as compared with stand-alone firms listed in the same market.   
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5  Information versus influence effects in internal capital markets: 
hypotheses and results 
 
5.1 Hypotheses 
 
The results above suggest that internal capital markets exist: parents appear to have a 
financing relationship with their separately listed subsidiaries. Moreover this transfer is 
negatively related to the investment opportunities of the parent firm, suggesting that 
finance is being allocated in response to the relative profitability of projects within the 
group. With the full sample of subsidiaries, we can examine how the operation of the 
internal capital market responds to changes in the size of the owner’s stake in the 
subsidiary. Our second set of experiments uses the sample of foreign-owned firms since 
this provides the cross-sectional variation across (i) distance between owner and 
subsidiary, and (ii) the development of the capital market in the parent and subsidiary 
country that we use to identify the conditions under which internal capital markets 
enhance rather than depress efficient investment.  
 
Theories that emphasize the ‘bright side’ of internal capital markets focus on the 
information and control advantages afforded to the CEO as a provider of internal finance 
over the providers of external finance. This theory rests on the superior ability of the 
CEO to pick winners from among her business units as discussed in Gertner, Scharfstein 
and Stein (1994) and Li and Li (1996). This is likely to be improved when the subsidiary 
is nearby and when the owner has a large stake. 
 
However for different reasons, control and proximity may worsen the efficiency with 
which internal capital markets allocate funds to subsidiaries. Much of the theoretical 
work on the ‘dark side’ of internal capital markets considers the incentives of managers at 
the level below the CEO. Several papers have addressed the question of why such 
behaviour may distort the CEO’s capital budget decision, rather than just affect the 
distribution of managerial compensation.17 Scharfstein and Stein (2000) consider the case 
where the CEO is herself an agent and finds it more attractive to compensate the 
managers of poorly performing divisions with greater investment rather than with cash, 
which the CEO would prefer to reserve for alternative uses. Stein (2003) cites the 
example of the successful diversified conglomerate, General Electric, whose policy of 
rotating its managers between divisions has the benefit of reducing managers’ incentives 
to lobby for excess capital.  
 
Thus the efficiency of internal capital markets involves a trade-off between the 
potentially positive effects of information and deleterious effects of influence. If parents 
in close proximity are able to overcome capital market imperfections better than parents 
at a distance then more concentrated ownership and closer parents should be associated 
with a more negative relationship to parents’ Q. If the influence of the parent is to the 
detriment of the subsidiary, and this increases more with proximity than do the beneficial 
                                                 
17
 Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) suggests that ‘socialism’, i.e. a more equal allocation of resources 
among divisions, might increase incentives for division managers to cooperate and reduce rent-seeking 
behaviour. 
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effects of increased information, then we would expect proximity to decrease the 
efficiency of the internal capital market.  
 
Likewise we explore whether the quality of the institutional environment of the country 
in which the subsidiary is located relative to that of the parent influence the ‘internal 
liquidity’ and ‘competition for funds’ effects. There is evidence suggesting that foreign 
affiliates often substitute internal borrowing for external borrowing when operating in 
environments with poorly developed financial markets (Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2003). 
Table 10 indicates that in our sample, over 50% of our owned firms are ‘high-high’, i.e. 
both subsidiaries and their parents are listed in a country with a high level of financial 
development. In 40% of the sample subsidiaries but not their parents are located in 
countries with low financial development.  
 
Table 10. Location of parents and subsidiaries by level of financial development 
 
% Parent-subsidiary pairs: 
   
 Parent in High Financial 
Development Country 
Parent in Low Financial 
Development Country 
Subsidiary in High 
Financial Development 
Country 
53.7% 1.03% 
Subsidiary in Low Financial 
Development Country 
40.5% 5.64% 
 
Notes: Data is from 4,200 parent-subsidiary pairs. For details of the source of the data, see Section 3. 
 
Do subsidiaries in countries with relatively poor financial institutions benefit more from 
the availability of an internal capital market than those in countries with institutional 
quality closer to that of the parent? Or are they more vulnerable to influence costs? If the 
former is so, we predict a stronger effect of parent Q on subsidiary investment when 
interacted with a measure of weakness of the financial institutions in the subsidiary’s 
country. These predictions are summarized in Table 11: if information benefits outweigh 
excessive control and influence costs, we would predict enhanced Tobin’s Q effects in 
subsidiaries operating in countries with weaker domestic financial markets. 
 
Table 11 summarizes the interactive influences of ownership characteristics on the 
predicted Tobin’s Q relations to subsidiary investment. By including interactive terms of 
the Tobin’s Q variables in equation 2, we would predict that if the  informational benefits 
conferred by the parent on the subsidiary outweigh their excessive control and influence 
costs, then there should be enhanced Tobin’s Q effects associated with more concentrated 
and closer parents and of their presence when subsidiaries are located in a weaker 
financial environment (and vice versa if influence costs outweigh information benefits).   
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Table 11. Prediction of the effect of (a) a more concentrated parent, (b) a closer 
parent, and (c) the presence of a parent when the subsidiary is in a weaker financial 
environment on the Tobin’s Q terms of the parent and subsidiary in an investment 
equation of the subsidiary 
 
Theory Q  
(subsidiary) 
Q  
(parent) 
Information + - 
Influence - + 
 
 
5.2 Results for distance and control 
 
Column 1 of Table 12 reports the effects of concentration of ownership of the parent on 
the investment of the subsidiary. The interactive effect of the ownership stake of the 
largest owner on the foreign owners’ Q and cash flow are reported. The negative Q effect 
of the parent diminishes with the size of the largest foreign ownership. Thus the internal 
capital market is stronger (exhibiting more reallocation in response to changes in 
investment opportunities) when the parent less tightly controls its subsidiary. Column 3 
of Table 12 confirms that the same pattern characterizes the smaller sample of foreign-
owned firms.   
 
In Column 4, we report the impact of distance from the parent on the investment of its 
subsidiary for the sample of foreign-owned firms. We find that the effect of the parent’s 
Q becomes more negative as distance increases. Consistent with influence effects 
dominating information effects this suggests that investment in subsidiaries of more 
distant firms is more sensitive to their parent’s investment opportunities. Increased 
investment opportunities for the headquarters are more likely to result in reduced 
investment by the subsidiary when the subsidiary is located further from the parent. We 
interpret this as evidence that the loss of information is outweighed by the benefits of 
reduced influence. The CEO is less susceptible to influence activities from more remote 
managers, with whom she has a more ‘arms length’ relationship as a result of greater 
geographical distance and a smaller ownership stake.18   
 
                                                 
18
 The results in Table 12 suggest that the failure to find a significant effect of parent cash flow on 
subsidiary investment in the basic regression in Table 8 (or the equivalent regression for foreign-owned 
firms in Column 2 of Table 12) reflects heterogeneity in the sample. Once the proximity measures of 
ownership concentration or distance are introduced, the parent’s cash flow becomes significant. 
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Table 12.  Ownership Concentration and Distance 
 
 1 2 3 4 
Variable Owned firms 
× ownership 
concentration 
Foreign-owned firms Foreign-owned × 
ownership 
concentration 
Foreign-owned × 
distance 
     
SGi 0.0049*** 0.0066*** 0.0069*** 0.0067*** 
 0.0012 0.0017 0.0022 0.0018 
CFi 0.0516*** 0.0430*** 0.0457*** 0.0443*** 
 0.0060 0.0087 0.0115 0.0089 
CFj 0.0236* 0.0077 0.0232* 0.0463*** 
 0.0128 0.0119 0.0139 0.0226 
CFj × Concj -0.0029*  -0.0029*  
 0.0015  0.0015  
Qi 0.0085*** 0.0088*** 0.0097*** 0.0086*** 
 0.0004 0.0006 0.0007 0.0006 
Qj -0.0012*** -0.0012*** -0.0012*** -0.0000 
 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0001 
Qj × Concj 0.0003***  0.0003***  
 0.0001  0.0001  
CFj × Distj    -0.0011** 
    0.0005 
Qj × Distj    -0.0019*** 
    0.0007 
Constant 0.0363*** 0.0347*** 0.0354*** 0.0348*** 
 0.0008 0.0013 0.0016 0.0013 
     
N 22079 9537 6798 9087 
R2 .0393 .0377 .0464 .0378 
Notes: Columns 1 to 4 are estimated by OLS with firm fixed effects and year dummies. R2 is the ‘within’ 
R2. Robust standard errors are reported beneath the coefficients. *** 1%; ** 5% and * 10% level of 
significance. 
 
 
To summarize, the internal capital market is stronger (exhibiting more reallocation in 
response to changes in investment opportunities) when the firms are more distant or the 
owner’s stake is smaller (although above 50%). We interpret this as supporting the 
primacy of influence costs over information effects.19 The presence of other owners or 
lower geographical proximity serves to distance the CEO of the parent firm from the 
managers of the subsidiary. The costs of lower information appear to be outweighed by 
the benefits of reduced influence effects.  
 
5.3 Results for financial development and structure 
 
In this section, we test whether the efficiency of investment in owned firms is sensitive to 
the level of financial development broadly defined (by the ratio of credit to the private 
sector to GDP) and or to the financial structure of the country as defined by the size of 
the stock market to GDP.  
 
                                                 
19
 As shown in Table A3 in the Appendix, these results hold for the sample of Non US firms as well. 
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We conduct this experiment in two steps: first we look at the sample of owned firms and 
simply add to our basic regression (Table 8) an interaction between the firm’s financial 
variables (cash flow and Q) and a measure of financial development or structure. Column 
1 of Table 13 reports that in countries with a higher level of financial development, there 
is a greater impact of Q on investment. There is no sign that a larger stock market per se 
has this effect (Column 3). In Columns 2 and 4, we look at foreign-owned firms and at 
whether the relative level of financial development or stock market size between the 
country in which the subsidiary is located and that of its parent affects the role of the 
parent’s Q in the subsidiary’s investment. The measures we use are the ratios of private 
credit to GDP (or stock market capitalization to GDP) in the subsidiary country to the 
parent country.  
 
Table 13.  Country Financial Development and Financial Structure.  
 
 1 2 3 4 
Variable Owned Foreign-owned Owned Foreign-owned 
     
SGi 0.0063*** 0.0057*** 0.0054*** 0.0041*** 
 0.0010 0.0018 0.0010 0.0020 
CFi 0.0344*** 0.0444*** 0.0412*** 0.0372*** 
 0.0083 0.0088 0.0053 0.0097 
Qi 0.0058*** 0.0087*** 0.0081*** 0.0095*** 
 0.0006 0.0006 0.0003 0.0007 
CFi×PrivCredi 0.9339    
 0.6808    
Qi ×PrivCredi 0.2307***    
 0.0470    
CFj  0.0585**  0.0701*** 
  0.0263  0.0212 
CFj×PrivCredij  -0.0377**   
  0.0177   
Qj  0.0008  -0.0019** 
 
 
0.0008  0.0008 
Qj×PrivCredij  -0.0017**   
 
 
0.0006   
CFi×StockMarketi   0.0782  
   0.0621  
Qi×StockMarketi   0.0011  
   0.0020  
CFj×StockMarketij    -0.0373*** 
    0.0105 
Qj×StockMarketij    0.0007 
    0.0008 
Constant 0.0344*** 0.0353*** 0.0341*** 0.0333*** 
 0.0006 0.0013 0.0006 0.0015 
     
N 29356 9309 29014 7739 
R2 .0359 .0385 .0345 .0392 
Notes: Columns 1 to 4 are estimated by OLS with firm fixed effects and year dummies. R2 is the ‘within’ 
R2. Robust standard errors are reported beneath the coefficients. *** 1%; ** 5% and * 10% level of 
significance. Privcredij is the ratio of private credit to GDP in the subsidiary country to that in the parent 
country. StockMarketij is the ratio of stock market capitalization over GDP in the subsidiary country to that 
in the parent country. 
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Column 2 records that as the gap between the level of financial development in the 
subsidiary country and the owner country narrows, the negative effect of parent Q 
intensifies and efficient allocation within the MNE is enhanced.  This is consistent with 
the hypothesis that influence effects are more likely to prevail when the subsidiary is in a 
weaker financial environment. There is a smaller effect of parent Q on investment in 
subsidiaries operating in weak financial markets.20 
 
 
6  Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate how the presence of a parent affects the 
investment behaviour of subsidiary firms. The study is relevant to several different but 
related literatures on internal capital markets, foreign direct investment and the 
macroeconomic experience of countries in financial crisis. 
 
The approach we have taken is to examine the influence of foreign ownership in two 
stages. First in the context of internal versus external capital markets, we present 
evidence supporting the existence of internal capital markets that reallocate finance to 
members of multinational networks with superior investment opportunities. Second, we 
explore how various characteristics of the relationship between the subsidiary firm and its 
parent affect the efficiency of this reallocation. A new data set is employed that allows 
the investment opportunities of the subsidiary firm to be observed independently of those 
of the parent. 
 
The results reported in this paper point in the direction of suggesting that there are 
benefits associated with ownership from the perspective of subsidiary firms. In general 
the information and resources available to parent firms relative to stand-alone firms 
improve the allocation of capital. There is evidence consistent with reduced financial 
constraints and of the allocation of capital according to the relative profitability of 
different parts of the global businesses.   
 
The beneficial effects of foreign ownership are particularly in evidence when the 
ownership stake of the foreign parent is relatively modest and when the parent is distant 
from the subsidiary. The possible loss of information associated with smaller ownership 
stakes and distance appears to be outweighed by the potential influence drawbacks that 
arise from large ownership stakes and close proximity of a parent.   
 
When we examine the impact of financial development, we find that there is a greater 
impact of own-Q on investment in countries with better financial development. We find 
that efficient allocation within MNEs is more in evidence as the gap between the level of 
financial development between subsidiary and owner country diminishes. Presumably 
this is because influence effects can be better controlled when financial environments are 
                                                 
20
 We note that allowing for heterogeneity of this kind brings out the significant positive effect of parent 
cash flow on subsidiary investment – a phenomenon we saw earlier when distance and ownership 
concentration were introduced. 
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more similar and function better. Thus whereas geographical distance appears to enhance 
efficiency in the firm network, divergence in financial development reduces it.  
 
Returning to the initial puzzle presented by investment behaviour in the Asian crisis, our 
results suggest that the larger responses of foreign-owned firms in reducing their capital 
investment during the East Asian crisis may reflect the greater alternative investment 
opportunities available to foreign-owned firms. Distant parents with small ownership 
stakes may have been particularly well placed to make objective commercial assessments 
without being subject to the same degree of local influence as domestic firms and those in 
close proximity to their subsidiaries. 
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Appendix 
 
1. Construction of the data-set 
A. Primary source  
We begin with the population of firms listed on the world’s stock exchanges provided by 
the OSIRIS database published by Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing which gathers 
its information from several sources including World’Vest Base, Fitch, Thomson 
Financial, Reuters, and Moody’s. For 2005, there are 28,915 firms listed on the world’s 
stock exchanges. Table A1 presents the distribution of these firms by country. 
 
Table A1. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Country Firms 
 
 
 
Number 
Stand- 
alone 
 
 
(% firms) 
Owned 
 
 
 
(% firms) 
Foreign- 
owned 
 
 
(% firms) 
Owner of  
firm(s) 
 
 
(% firms) 
Owner of  
foreign  
firm(s) 
 
(% firms) 
Argentina 92 54% 45% 20% 1% 1% 
Australia 1362 81% 16% 13% 3% 3% 
Austria 90 66% 31% 7% 3% 3% 
Bahrain 28 64% 32% 21% 4% 4% 
Belgium 137 54% 42% 13% 4% 4% 
Brazil 401 63% 36% 14% 1% 1% 
Canada 1356 76% 22% 15% 3% 2% 
Chile 232 72% 26% 12% 2% 2% 
China 1316 85% 15% 14% 0% 0% 
Colombia 77 75% 22% 12% 3% 3% 
Costa Rica 17 88% 12% 6% 0% 0% 
Croatia 23 52% 48% 17% 0% 0% 
Czech Republic 49 55% 45% 14% 0% 0% 
Denmark 147 71% 26% 10% 3% 3% 
Egypt 364 86% 14% 11% 0% 0% 
Estonia 13 46% 54% 15% 0% 0% 
Finland 127 68% 28% 8% 5% 5% 
France 699 38% 56% 9% 6% 6% 
Germany 756 48% 47% 13% 4% 4% 
Greece 233 39% 58% 11% 3% 3% 
Hong Kong 269 78% 19% 7% 3% 3% 
Hungary 28 75% 18% 7% 7% 7% 
Iceland 14 71% 21% 7% 7% 7% 
India 736 78% 21% 9% 1% 1% 
Indonesia 297 81% 19% 13% 0% 0% 
Ireland 64 66% 25% 11% 9% 9% 
Israel 169 82% 17% 8% 1% 1% 
Italy 229 41% 53% 11% 6% 6% 
Jamaica 30 53% 43% 3% 3% 3% 
Japan 3598 83% 14% 8% 2% 2% 
Jordan 31 84% 16% 6% 0% 0% 
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Kazakhstan 15 73% 27% 13% 0% 0% 
Kenya 13 62% 38% 0% 0% 0% 
Korea, Republic of1460 60% 39% 8% 1% 1% 
Kuwait 49 88% 10% 4% 2% 2% 
Latvia 23 65% 35% 9% 0% 0% 
Lithuania 10 40% 60% 20% 0% 0% 
Luxembourg 37 57% 41% 14% 5% 5% 
Malaysia 941 86% 13% 7% 1% 1% 
Mauritius 37 89% 11% 8% 0% 0% 
Mexico 141 66% 26% 4% 8% 8% 
Morocco 13 54% 46% 8% 0% 0% 
Netherlands 175 65% 22% 6% 14% 14% 
New Zealand 110 81% 18% 8% 1% 1% 
Nigeria 32 84% 16% 9% 0% 0% 
Norway 136 68% 27% 6% 5% 5% 
Pakistan 140 76% 21% 2% 2% 2% 
Panama 15 80% 20% 13% 0% 0% 
Peru 162 74% 26% 6% 0% 0% 
Philippines 226 83% 16% 8% 1% 1% 
Poland 64 41% 59% 13% 0% 0% 
Portugal 72 50% 44% 10% 7% 7% 
Russia 45 58% 42% 7% 0% 0% 
Saudi Arabia 16 69% 31% 13% 0% 0% 
Singapore 516 79% 19% 8% 2% 2% 
Slovakia 11 55% 45% 0% 0% 0% 
South Africa 319 73% 20% 1% 6% 6% 
Spain 148 48% 45% 11% 8% 8% 
Sri Lanka 135 87% 10% 4% 3% 3% 
Sweden 242 57% 35% 3% 9% 9% 
Switzerland 224 44% 48% 12% 8% 8% 
Thailand 420 86% 13% 6% 1% 1% 
Tunisia 40 70% 28% 5% 3% 3% 
Turkey 242 84% 14% 4% 1% 1% 
United Arab Emirates11 64% 36% 9% 0% 0% 
United Kingdom 1869 71% 20% 9% 10% 9% 
United States 7751 76% 20% 3% 4% 4% 
Venezuela 58 81% 19% 3% 0% 0% 
Zimbabwe 13 62% 31% 0% 8% 8% 
 
 
 
B. Identifying stand-alone, owned and owner firms in the data-set. 
The OSIRIS data records a firm as having a parent if another entity has financial and 
legal responsibility for it, i.e., it holds more than 50 per cent and less than 100 per cent of 
the subsidiary’s equity. Figure A1 illustrates the selection criteria and data sources used 
to construct the sample of owned, owner, and stand-alone firms. 
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Figure A1. Constructing the sample 
Population of listed firms in 2005
28,915 firms [OSIRIS]
100% > owned = 50% by another entity?
YES
NO
Define as stand-
alone firm
Regression sample: discard if: different 
owner in 1994; parent entity is not a firm 
in database with available financial 
information
4,886 owned 
firms
NO
Owner = 50% of another firm in 
database? [OSIRIS]
YES
Define as 
owner firm
Key financial information 
available? [Datastream]
YES
1,028 owner 
firms
YES
16,272 stand-
alone firms
 
 
 
The OSIRIS data only reports ownership at one point in time 2005, but we have older 
ownership data from Dun and Bradstreet which enables us to identify ownership in 1994. 
After matching these data we exclude firms from the sample if the location of their owner 
is different in these two datasets. 
 
We discard subsidiary firms from the sample if they experienced a change in ownership 
over the period, or if their ownership information is unavailable, or if key financial 
information (matched to and collected from Datastream) is missing over the period. This 
leaves us with 4,886 subsidiaries which have been continuously owned and controlled by 
1,028 distinct global ultimate firms over the period.   
 
C. Sources and definitions of variables  
The OSIRIS data-base reports a unique identification number for each parent firm that 
enables us to match firms with financial data on their parents. This was merged with the 
market and financial data from Datastream.  
 
The parent’s data is given in consolidated form, so we take out the effect of the 
subsidiary to extract the parent’s pure data.21 
 
 
 
                                                 
21
 For example we use the employment in the subsidiary Ei and the total consolidated employment, ET to 
determine the firm’s Qj which we call parent’s Q, but really refers to the Q of the entire entity except the 
subsidiary. The firm’s consolidated Q is QT = ((Qi*Ei + Qj*Ej)/ET). So parent’s Q is Qj =(QT*ET-Qi*Ei)/Ej.  
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Capital expenditure: funds used to acquire fixed assets including expenditures on plant 
and equipment, structures and property but excluding any expenditures associated with 
mergers or acquisitions. To account for differences in size and for inflation over time and 
to avoid heteroscedasticity we divide investment by total assets at the beginning of the 
period.  Datastream item 08416 Asset Utilization Ratio measured as the annual item 
Capital Expenditures / (Total Assets - Customer Liabilities on Acceptances). 
 
Average Q: the firm’s market-to-book ratio at the end of the prior fiscal year. To 
calculate parent’s Q, we took the effect of subsidiary variables out of consolidated data in 
order to get parent’s data, i.e. Total Q = asset-weighted sum of parent and subsidiary Q; 
from which we calculate unconsolidated Q. Q is the share price divided by the book value 
per share (Datastream PTBV). 
 
Liquidity.  Cash flow divided by total assets at the start of the year. Datastream item 
04860 (Net cash flow from operating activities) divided by total assets.  Q is the share 
price divided by the book value per share (Datastream PTBV). 
 
Sales growth. Sales growth is the log difference in sales in US$ from Datastream item 
number 07240. 
 
Distance to owner is the great circle distance between capital cities of the two countries 
measured as a percentage of half the earth’s circumference (i.e. max is 100). 
 
Employees is Datastream item WC07011. 
 
Ratio of credit to the private sector to GDP and size of the stock market to GDP.  
 
Recession year dummy. Quarterly GDP data from the IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics (IFS). The recession dummy variable indicating whether a country is 
experiencing a recession in a particular year is constructed following Braun and Larrain 
(2005). For each country ‘troughs’ are identified as years when the current log of real 
local currency GDP (from World Bank, 2005) deviates by more than one standard 
deviation from its trend level (computed using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a 
smoothing parameter of 100). A local peak is then defined as the most recent year for 
which cyclical GDP (the difference between actual and trend values) is higher than the 
previous and posterior years. The recession variable is one for the years between the peak 
and trough (excluding the peak year), and zero for other years. 
 
2. Propensity Score Matching Results 
Table A2.  
 
We use the propensity score matching method of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). We 
identify the probability that a firm is a subsidiary using a probit model. We use the 
predicted probability, Pikc, as a monotone function to select comparison stand-alone 
observations for each subsidiary observation. The nearest neighbour, k, to each subsidiary 
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observation is selected to minimize the difference between the subsidiary firm and the 
stand-alone firm with similar predicted values. 
 
Matching Regression:  
  
Qi 0.008 
 (0.005)* 
SGi 0.069 
 (0.029)** 
CFi 0.012 
 (0.003)*** 
Age 0.006 
 (0.001)*** 
Industry dummies Yes 
Country dummies Yes 
Observations 24982 
R2 0.081 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
3. Robustness: Distance and Ownership Concentration Interactions for Non-US 
firms 
Table A3. 
This table extends the robustness check of Table 9 to illustrate that the findings in Table 
12 are robust to excluding the US firms from the sample.  
 
 1 2 
Variable Non-US firms Non-US firms 
   
SGi 0.0066*** 0.0067*** 
 0.0019 0.0023 
CFi 0.0428*** 0.0441*** 
 0.0098 0.0124 
Qi 0.0089*** 0.0101*** 
 0.0007 0.0007 
CFj 0.0555** 0.0173 
 0.0265 0.0159 
Qj -0.0000 -0.0018*** 
 0.0001 0.0005 
CFj  × Distj -0.0014**  
 0.0005  
Qj × Distj -0.0029***  
 0.0008  
CFj ×Concj  -0.0025 
  0.0016 
Qj × Concj  0.0004*** 
  0.0001 
Constant 0.0357*** 0.0359*** 
 0.0014 0.0017 
N 7858 5903 
R2 .039 .0477 
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